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 A Model of Unemployment 
with Matching Frictions 
and Job Rationing
Pascal Michaillat
Large fl uctuations in unemployment frequently recur 
across the United States and Europe, most recently in 
2009, and remain a major concern for policymakers. Many 
different macroeconomic theories of unemployment have 
been offered. These theories deliver confl icting results 
about the welfare cost of unemployment and the impact of 
various labor market policies, which makes it diffi cult to 
develop policy recommendations. In fact, there seems to be 
no consensus on how much governments should spend on 
unemployment-reducing policies, and which specifi c policies 
they should implement. Therefore, it is critical to identify the 
main sources of unemployment over the business cycle in 
order to develop effective unemployment-reducing policies. 
This is what I attempt to do in this dissertation.
Overview 
This dissertation proposes a model of the labor market 
that integrates two important sources of unemployment. 
The fi rst source is a matching friction, which is a friction 
in matching unemployed workers to recruiting fi rms. The 
second source is job rationing, which is a possible shortage 
of jobs in the economy. To examine how these two sources 
interact over the business cycle, I decompose unemployment 
into a component caused by job rationing—rationing 
unemployment—and another component caused by matching 
frictions—frictional unemployment. Formally, I defi ne 
rationing unemployment as the level of unemployment 
that would prevail if matching frictions disappeared, and 
frictional unemployment as additional unemployment due to 
the matching frictions.
The main theoretical result of this dissertation is that 
during recessions rationing unemployment increases, 
driving the rise in total unemployment, whereas frictional 
unemployment decreases. Intuitively, in bad times, there are 
too few jobs, the labor market is slack, recruiting is easy, and 
matching frictions contribute little to unemployment.
I specify a model in which job rationing stems from a 
small amount of wage rigidity and diminishing marginal 
returns to labor. In the model calibrated with U.S. data, 
I fi nd that when unemployment is below 5 percent, it is 
only frictional, but when unemployment reaches 9 percent, 
frictional unemployment amounts to less than 2 percent of 
the labor force, and rationing unemployment to more than 
7 percent. These results suggest that cyclical fl uctuations 
in the composition of unemployment are quantitatively 
large: in expansions, all of unemployment is due to 
matching frictions; on the other hand, a very large share of 
unemployment can be explained by job rationing alone in 
recessions.
I then show that in recessions, job rationing generates 
ineffi ciently high unemployment, which leaves room for 
labor market policies to improve social welfare. I evaluate 
three labor market policies—1) direct employment, 2) 
placement services, and 3) a wage subsidy—over the 
business cycle. First, I compute fi scal multipliers (the 
increase in social welfare obtained by spending one dollar 
on a policy) as a function of the state of the labor market 
to determine the effectiveness of these unemployment-
reducing policies. I show that placement services are more 
effective in good times than in bad times, while direct 
employment and wage subsidy are more effective in bad 
times than in good times. Then, I characterize the optimal 
mix of policies that could be implemented by a benevolent 
government. The optimal unemployment-reducing policy 
evolves over the business cycle: its puts more weight on 
policy instruments reducing matching frictions in good 
times than in bad times; conversely, it puts more weight on 
policy instruments creating jobs directly in bad times than 
in good times. Intuitively in expansions, unemployment 
is caused by matching frictions, so policies reducing these 
frictions are effective and should be implemented in priority; 
unemployment is caused by a lack of jobs in bad times, so 
policies creating jobs directly are effective and should be 
implemented in priority.
Below, I justify my focus on matching frictions and job 
rationing as sources of unemployment. I then describe in 
detail my model of unemployment, delve into the results of 
the dissertation, and relate my work to the literature.
The Importance of Matching Frictions and 
Job Rationing
The dissertation proposes a model of the labor market 
that integrates two important sources of unemployment: 
matching frictions and job rationing. It studies how these two 
sources interact over the business cycle to shed new light on 
the mechanics of unemployment fl uctuations and the role for 
unemployment-reducing labor market policies. The focus on 
these specifi c sources of unemployment is motivated by two 
observations described below.
First, labor markets see constant job destruction and job 
creation, as well as large fl ows of workers (Blanchard and 
Diamond 1989; Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh 1996). So, 
frictions constantly hindering matching of workers and fi rms 
are bound to infl uence the mechanics of the labor market.
Second, there are many hurdles to wage adjustment in 
the labor market. These hurdles sometimes force wages 
to remain above market-clearing levels, leading to job 
rationing. Unions and minimum wage laws are examples of 
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such obstacles to wage adjustment; internal labor markets 
are another. Two well-documented characteristics of internal 
labor markets are relevant to explain why they may lead 
to job rationing. First, the internal pay structure does not 
respond to competitive forces in external labor market. 
For instance, Doeringer and Piore (1971) emphasize that 
“the internal labor market is governed by a set of rules and 
procedure.” They say that “the jobs within the internal labor 
market are shielded from the direct infl uences of competitive 
forces in the external labor markets [and] these rules are 
not consistent with pricing and distribution of labor which 
would prevail in a competitive market.” Therefore, when 
aggregate demand for labor falls, wages are constrained to 
remain above market clearing levels, rationing the number of 
jobs in the economy. Second, wages in internal labor markets 
tend to be high to elicit effort and dedication from employees 
(Bewley 1999; Jacoby 1984). The internal labor market 
organization is pervasive today, to the point where any 
human resource textbook dedicates a chapter to the design of 
internal labor markets (for example, Billikopf [2003]).
A Model with Matching Frictions and 
Job Rationing
The model of the labor market described in the 
dissertation builds on Pissarides’ (2000) search-and-
matching model by relaxing two of its key assumptions: 
completely fl exible wages and constant marginal returns to 
labor. These assumptions are critical because either implies 
that unemployment would disappear in the absence of 
matching frictions. To relax these assumptions, I develop 
a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which 
large, monopolistic fi rms face a labor market with matching 
frictions, as in Blanchard and Gali (2008). All household 
members are in the labor force at all times, either working 
or searching for a job. Firms set prices and hire new workers 
each period in response to exogenous job destruction and 
technology shocks. Recruiting is costly because of matching 
frictions, especially in expansions when many fi rms compete 
to recruit from a small pool of unemployed workers.
In a frictional labor market there is no compelling 
theory of wage determination, which prompts the choice 
of a general wage schedule. Instead of deriving results for 
a particular wage-setting mechanism, I fi nd conditions on 
the wage schedule for my results to hold. Furthermore, 
this generality allows me to nest as special cases various 
infl uential models of the search-and-matching literature, 
which provide valuable points of comparison.
Central to my analysis is job rationing. This assumption 
pertains to the behavior of the model at the limit when 
recruiting costs are nil. In search-and-matching models, 
fi rms and workers decide on a wage once they have matched. 
Any wage falling in the interval between the fl ow value of 
unemployment and the marginal revenue product of labor, 
which I call the effi ciency set, could be supported when the 
labor market is in equilibrium. This is because such a wage 
respects the private effi ciency of all matches: any worker-
fi rm pair prefers accepting this wage to breaking the match 
(Hall 2005).
Equilibrium unemployment in the labor market is 
infl uenced by the distance between the wage and the upper 
bound of the effi ciency set (the marginal revenue product of 
labor), because profi t-maximizing fi rms enter until wage plus 
marginal recruiting costs equal marginal revenue product of 
labor. If wages are well below the marginal revenue product 
of labor, recruiting costs must be high in equilibrium, which 
implies that the labor market is tight and unemployment is 
low. If wages are close to the marginal revenue product of 
labor, recruiting costs must be low in equilibrium, which 
implies that the labor market is slack and unemployment 
is high. When recruiting costs fall to zero, determining 
equilibrium unemployment is even simpler: if the wage 
remains below the upper bound of the effi ciency set for all 
employment levels, then the economy converges to full 
employment; if the wage remains below the upper bound 
until some employment level N*, and is above the upper 
bound for N > N*, then the economy converges to N*.
In all existing search-and-matching models, we are 
in the fi rst scenario: the economy converges to full 
employment absent recruiting costs. The canonical search-
and-matching model assumes that the wage is the outcome 
of Nash bargaining (Mortensen and Pissarides 1994). By 
construction, the wage always falls into the effi ciency set, 
which implies that the wage always remains below the 
marginal revenue product of labor. Therefore if recruitment 
costs fall to zero, fi rms will make a positive profi t on each 
new match and will enter the labor market until there is 
full employment. Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005) introduce 
real wage rigidity into search-and-matching models, in 
the form of a constant real wage. A constant wage is not 
the outcome of any bargaining, so it could fall outside the 
effi ciency set. However, since these models assume atomistic 
fi rms for simplicity, the effi ciency set is simply the interval 
between the fl ow value of being unemployed and the level 
of technology (which corresponds to labor productivity), 
and it is independent of aggregate employment. Thus, if 
technology is above the constant wage, fi rms enter until there 
is full employment if recruitment costs fall to zero, as in the 
canonical search-and-matching model.1
In contrast, I propose a model in which we are in the 
latter scenario. I assume that there is a range of technology 
and a nondegenerate range of employment for which the 
wage lies outside of the effi ciency set; more precisely, 
when technology is low enough and employment is high 
enough, wages are above the marginal revenue product 
of labor. Under this assumption, jobs are rationed when 
technology is low enough: even if recruiting costs were zero, 
workers could not all be profi tably employed, and some 
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unemployment, which I call rationing unemployment, would 
remain. This is because profi t-maximizing fi rms expand 
employment to the point where the marginal revenue product 
of labor equals the marginal cost of hiring a worker, which 
includes wage and recruiting costs; in particular, fi rms do not 
hire past the point at which the marginal revenue product of 
labor equals the wage. When recruiting costs are positive, 
unemployment is higher than rationing unemployment, and 
the difference between the former and the latter is labeled 
frictional unemployment.
After an analysis of the general model, I specialize 
production function and wage schedule to propose a model 
in which the combination of diminishing marginal returns to 
labor and some wage rigidity yields job rationing. Intuitively, 
after suffi ciently large negative technology shocks, the 
marginal revenue product of labor falls; wages only partially 
adjust downward, such that wage may now be higher than 
the marginal revenue product of labor for the last workers 
in the labor force. Accordingly, fi rms cut employment to 
increase the marginal revenue product of labor at least until it 
equals the wage. In this model, jobs are rationed because not 
all workers could be employed even absent recruiting costs.
The assumptions of wage rigidity and diminishing 
marginal returns to labor are appealing because they are 
standard in the macroeconomic literature, and because they 
have received convincing empirical support. At business 
cycle frequency, some production inputs may be slow to 
adjust; thus, short-run production functions are likely to 
exhibit diminishing marginal returns to labor. There are 
also substantial ethnographic and empirical literatures 
documenting wage rigidity. Hence, job rationing arises 
naturally in a search-and-matching model of the labor 
market.
The model of the labor market put forward in the 
dissertation is amenable to evaluating a number of labor 
market policies. In the last part of the thesis, I introduce 
three unemployment-reducing policies into the dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium model. The fi rst one is direct 
employment, which hires unemployed workers in public-
sector jobs, or offers contracts to private-sector fi rms to 
produce goods consumed by the government. The second 
policy is placement services, which enhance unemployed 
workers’ job search effi ciency to reduce matching frictions. 
The third policy is a wage subsidy, which reduces the cost 
of labor faced by private fi rms. Studying these policies is 
especially relevant since governments have historically 
resorted to these policies on a large scale. These three 
policies are also among the most commonly used by 
European states.
Contributions
This dissertation develops a tractable model that 
distinguishes between two components of unemployment: 
rationing unemployment and frictional unemployment. 
By studying these components, I derive three results that 
improve our understanding of unemployment fl uctuations: 
1) I show that during a recession, rationing unemployment 
increases, driving the rise in total unemployment, while 
frictional unemployment decreases; 2) I construct historical 
time series for frictional and rationing unemployment in a 
calibrated model of the labor market to fi nd that fl uctuations 
in the composition of unemployment are quantitatively large; 
3) I study the normative implications of these positive results 
to fi nd that the optimal unemployment-reducing policy 
should evolve with the state of the labor market: the optimal 
policy aims at creating jobs directly in recessions, and at 
reducing matching frictions in expansions.
When do matching frictions matter? Not in bad times
I formally defi ne the rationing component of 
unemployment as the part that would prevail if recruiting 
costs were zero, and the frictional component as additional 
unemployment due to positive recruiting costs. Rationing 
unemployment quantifi es the amount of unemployment due 
to job rationing, whereas frictional unemployment quantifi es 
the amount due to matching frictions.
This dissertation proposes a condition under which 
rationing unemployment is positive. It then proves 
theoretically that during a recession, rationing unemployment 
increases, driving the rise in total unemployment, while 
frictional unemployment decreases. This result suggests 
that job rationing trumps matching frictions to explain 
unemployment in recessions. These frictions, however, 
remain central to understand unemployment in expansions.
Intuitively, job rationing in recessions is more acute. 
Therefore, rationing unemployment increases, raising total 
unemployment. This means that a fi rm posting a vacancy 
will receive more applications from the large pool of 
unemployed workers, and it will be able to fi ll its vacancy 
more rapidly, and at a lower cost. So in recessions, because 
of matching frictions, the marginal cost of labor does 
not increase as much, monopolistic fi rms do not reduce 
production as much, and there is not much additional 
unemployment. Consequently matching frictions contribute 
less to unemployment, and frictional unemployment is lower 
in recessions.
Historical time series for frictional 
and rationing unemployment
To quantify the fl uctuations of frictional and rationing 
unemployment over the business cycle, I consider a special 
case of the general model in which the combination of 
diminishing marginal returns to labor and some wage rigidity 
leads to job rationing. Calibrating the model and imposing 
technology shocks estimated in U.S. data produces moments 
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for labor market variables that are close to their empirical 
counterparts. In particular, even a small amount of wage 
rigidity, such as that estimated in microdata with earnings 
of newly hired workers (for example, Haefke, Sonntag, 
and Van Rens [2008]), is suffi cient to amplify realistic 
technology shocks as much as observed in the data. I also 
compare actual unemployment with the unemployment 
series simulated from actual technology. Model-generated 
unemployment matches actual unemployment closely. These 
results suggest that in spite of its simplicity, the model fi ts 
the data notably well, lending support to the quantitative 
analysis of unemployment and its components.
Exploiting the calibrated model, I decompose historical 
U.S. unemployment into historical time series for rationing 
unemployment and frictional unemployment. These series 
suggest that as long as total unemployment is below 5.2 
percent, it can all be attributed to matching frictions. On 
average, total unemployment amounts to 5.8 percent of the 
labor force, frictional unemployment to 4.3 percent, and 
rationing unemployment to 1.5 percent. But in the second 
quarter of 2009, when total unemployment reached 9.2 
percent, rationing unemployment increased to 7.6 percent, 
while frictional unemployment decreased to 1.6 percent. 
Next, I simulate moments for unemployment and its 
components. I fi nd that rationing unemployment is more than 
twice as volatile as frictional unemployment.
Although concepts similar to those of frictional 
and rationing unemployment have long existed, this 
quantitative analysis has not previously been conducted.2 As 
highlighted by Romer (2002), “We do not know if frictional 
unemployment is one-quarter or three-quarters of total 
unemployment.”
State-dependent labor market policies
This dissertation shows that when job rationing generates 
ineffi ciently high unemployment, labor market policies 
can improve welfare signifi cantly. Specifi cally, I evaluate 
three labor market policies over the business cycle: 1) direct 
employment, 2) placement services, and 3) a wage subsidy. 
I assume that the government can commit to these policies. 
Policies are fi nanced by an exogenous, stochastic stream of 
income, and by issuance of state-contingent debt.
The fl uctuations in rationing and frictional unemployment 
suggest that optimal unemployment-reducing policies should 
adapt to the changing state of the labor market. To formalize 
this intuition, I compute state-dependent fi scal multipliers—
the increase in social welfare obtained by spending one 
dollar on a policy. I show that placement services are more 
effective in good times than in bad times. The converse is 
true of direct employment and wage subsidy. Intuitively, 
in bad times, frictional unemployment is low; placement 
services aim to further reduce this component and are 
therefore ineffective. The effectiveness of direct employment 
is a function of how much it crowds out private employment; 
in bad times, competition for workers is weak and crowding 
out is limited. Thus, this policy is effective. Finally, a wage 
subsidy reduces the marginal cost of labor, which leads 
fi rms to increase employment; higher aggregate employment 
increases the labor market tightness and recruiting costs 
until a new equilibrium is reached, at which point the new 
marginal cost of labor equals the marginal revenue product 
of labor. In bad times, recruiting costs are low and do not 
vary much with employment, so a wage subsidy triggers a 
large increase in employment. In good times, recruiting costs 
are high and increase rapidly with employment, so a wage 
subsidy will only achieve a small increase in employment; 
thus, a wage subsidy is more effective in bad times. In a 
calibrated model, when unemployment increases from 4 
percent to 12 percent, the multiplier for placement services 
decreases from 2 utils per dollar to 0.5 utils per dollar, the 
multiplier for direct employment increases from 0.3 util 
per dollar to 1 utils per dollar, and the multiplier for wage 
subsidy decreases from 1 util per dollar to 3.5 utils per dollar.
Then I characterize the optimal mix of policies 
implemented by a benevolent government. The optimal 
unemployment-reducing policy evolves over the business 
cycle: its puts more weight on policy instruments reducing 
matching frictions (placement services) in good times than 
in bad times; conversely, it puts more weight on policy 
instruments creating jobs directly (direct employment and 
wage subsidy) in bad times than in good times.
Relation to the Literature
The search-and-matching framework
The decomposition of unemployment into rationing 
unemployment and frictional unemployment, as well as 
the characterization of the cyclical fl uctuations in the 
components of unemployment, is new to the literature. In 
fact, existing models of unemployment only account for 
one single source of unemployment and are not amenable to 
unemployment decomposition.
For instance, in existing search-and-matching models, 
unemployment disappears when recruiting costs converge 
to zero. In other words, there is no job rationing and all 
unemployment is frictional. The canonical search-and-
matching model features atomistic fi rms in which the 
marginal product of labor remains above the value of 
unemployment for workers (Mortensen and Pissarides 
1994; Pissarides 2000). Once search costs are sunk, matches 
always generate a positive surplus, which is shared between 
fi rm and worker by Nash bargaining over wages. When 
recruiting costs converge to zero, the net profi t from a match 
is positive for any level of employment. Consequently, fi rms 
enter the labor market until all the labor force is employed. 
The property that unemployment disappears when recruiting 
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costs converge to zero also holds when rigid wages are 
introduced into the model (Shimer 2004; Hall 2005). This is 
because rigid wages always lie between the marginal product 
of labor, which is independent of employment, and the value 
of unemployment for workers. As with the basic search 
model, with no search costs fi rms enter the labor market until 
all the labor force is employed. Lastly, this property holds 
in large-fi rm search-and-matching models with diminishing 
marginal returns to labor (Cahuc and Wasmer 2001; Elsby 
and Michaels 2008). This is because these models use Stole 
and Zwiebel’s (1996) intrafi rm bargaining mechanism to set 
wages. Thus, the wage is derived from Nash bargaining over 
surplus from the marginal worker-fi rm match, and the wage 
remains below the marginal product of labor for any level of 
employment. Consequently, employers expand employment 
until all the labor force is employed when recruiting costs 
fall to zero.
The absence of job rationing in existing search-and-
matching models is critical. Without job rationing, all 
unemployment is frictional, which has several important 
implications for the impact of labor market policies on 
unemployment: policies improving matching always 
reduce unemployment signifi cantly, direct job creation 
by the government has no effect on unemployment, and 
policies reducing the search effort of the unemployed 
always increase unemployment signifi cantly. This paper 
offers a more nuanced theory of unemployment over the 
business cycle in which job rationing is the most important 
source of unemployment in recessions, and matching 
frictions are the most important source of unemployment 
in expansions. These results suggest that the effectiveness 
of labor market policies depends on the state of the labor 
market: policies improving matching reduce unemployment 
in expansions but not in recessions, direct job creation by the 
government has no effect on unemployment in expansions 
but reduces unemployment in recessions, and policies 
reducing the search effort of the unemployed, such as a 
generous unemployment insurance, increase unemployment 
in expansions but have no effect on unemployment in 
recessions. From a normative standpoint, these results imply 
that policymakers should adapt labor market policies to the 
state of the labor market.
The design of optimal fi scal policies
The policy results derived in the dissertation are related 
to two strands of literature. First, search models of the labor 
market have been specifi cally designed to study particular 
labor market policies, but these policies have never been 
compared (Mortensen and Pissarides 1999; Pissarides 2000; 
Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004). In addition, these studies 
do not emphasize the variations in the effectiveness of 
policies at different points of the business cycle. Second, 
raising revenue to fi nance policies could be distortionary. I 
abstract from these distortions and instead determine how to 
optimally spend a given amount of tax revenue. Therefore, 
these results complement the large literature on optimal 
taxation, which determines the least costly way to fi nance a 
given amount of government spending (Lucas and Stokey 
1983; Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe 1991; Aiyagari et al. 
2002).
Macroeconomic models of unemployment
More generally, this paper contributes to the 
unemployment literature by integrating two major strands 
of research: the search-and-matching literature, which has 
become the standard theoretical framework for analyzing 
labor market fl uctuations, and the job-rationing literature.
The Mortensen-Pissarides search-and-matching model has 
become the standard framework to analyze unemployment 
and labor market dynamics (Pissarides 1985; Mortensen 
and Pissarides 1994; Pissarides 2000). This model generates 
unemployment because workers cannot obtain jobs by 
bidding down wages to their reservation wage: in the 
presence of matching frictions, it takes time and effort to 
establish contact with an employer. This model has been used 
widely in macroeconomics and related disciplines; it has 
been embedded into real business cycle models (Merz 1995; 
Andolfatto 1996), dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
models with wage and price rigidities (Blanchard and Gali 
2008; Gertler and Trigari 2009), trade models (Helpman 
and Itskhoki 2007; Helpman and Redding 2008), and has 
been studied to understand the impact of different policy 
interventions on unemployment (Mortensen and Pissarides 
1999; Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004).
The job-rationing literature, on the other hand, dates at 
least as far back as Keynes’ wage fl oor. Researchers in this 
literature drew on fi eld studies by psychologists, sociologists, 
social psychologists, and anthropologists to motivate their 
models. This literature includes work on effi ciency-wage 
models (Stiglitz 1976; Solow 1979; Akerlof and Yellen 
1990), gift-exchange models (Akerlof 1982), insider-outsider 
models (Lindbeck and Snower 1988), and social-norm 
models (Solow 1980, Akerlof 1980). These papers put forth 
different theories explaining why profi t-maximizing fi rms 
may set wages above market-clearing levels. Generally, 
these theories postulate that higher wages increase effort 
and dedication to the fi rm, thus increasing productivity and 
profi tability. These theories have received support from 
economists who have studied wage-setting practices in the 
fi eld (for example, Okun [1981]; Campbell and Kamlani 
[1997]; Bewley 1999). In these models, unemployment is 
the equilibrium outcome of the shortage of jobs induced by 
excessively high wages.
This dissertation merges these branches of the literature to 
show that unemployment is best described as a combination 
of frictional and rationing unemployment: the search-and-
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matching theory describes the labor market well in normal 
and good times, and job-rationing theory describes the labor 
market well in bad times, but only the integration of both 
theories provides a good understanding of business-cycle 
fl uctuations in the labor market. This integration delivers 
novel and important policy recommendations as well.
Notes
1.  Note that if technology is below the constant wage, the labor 
market shuts down and all workers are unemployed for any 
recruiting cost.
2.  Rationing unemployment is similar to classical unemployment 
if rationing results from real wage rigidities. It is similar to 
cyclical unemployment if rationing results from demand shocks 
and price rigidity.
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